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Abstract When health plans compete under adverse selection, the competitive equi-
librium set of contracts is unique. However, the allocation of these contracts among
health plans is undetermined. We show that three health plans suffice to sustain an
equilibrium where each health plan offers a single contract and attracts a single type
of agent (full specialization). We also show that this equilibrium can be ruled out by
introducing any horizontal differentiation, and that if in equilibrium each health plan
attracts all types of agents, at least one of the health plans must do so through a menu
of contracts.
Keywords Health plans competition · Adverse selection · Differentiation
JEL Classification D82 · I11 · L13
1 Introduction
Health plans are a popular way to deliver health care. Health plans receive a fee per
affiliate in exchange for providing him/her directly with the required health care. They
are very important in the US as well as in some European countries. The main purpose
of our investigation is to explain why in reality it is often the case that health plans
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offer menus of contracts, despite the fact that this is not a necessary implication of the
usual model of competitive screening.
Indeed, since Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) seminal paper it is well understood
that one should observe two contracts in equilibrium—one intended for the low risks
and the other for the high risks. However, this does not mean that each health plan
offer both contracts, as in a menu.1 While menus are a possibility, a situation where
some health plans only offer the contract intended for the high risk individuals and
the rest only offer the contract intended for the low risk individuals also constitutes an
equilibrium (which we refer to as “full specialization”). It is important to highlight that
this equilibrium exists even if one allows health plans to offer menus of contracts. In
other words, it turns out that the same equilibrium set of available contracts emerges
independently of whether health plans are allowed to offer menus of contracts or just
single contracts.2 In this sense, the complexity of the offers by each plan is indeter-
minate. Our main contribution is to prove that this conclusion doe not extend to any
horizontal differentiation.3 We are in fact able go beyond this result. We can prove
that it cannot be an equilibrium that health plans attract all types of agents with a single
contract each, in other words, at least one health plan must offer a menu of contracts
in equilibrium. This may explain why in reality it is often the case that health plans
offer menus of contracts. For instance, in Washington, DC (zip code 20001) “Bravo
Classic” offers more comprehensive drug coverage than “Bravo Gold” but “Bravo
Gold” offers more comprehensive dental coverage.4
In order to fully grasp the importance of our result, we need to address the differ-
ence between contract complexity within and across risk classes. A risk class is the
set of individuals (usually defined by the value of their demographics such as age and
gender) that can choose among a set of contracts. In many contexts, “open enrolment
rules“ apply, meaning that the risk class is the entire population. In other contexts,
1 Even if each and all health plans offer a menu of contracts, it is not necessarily true that all health plans
obtain the same share of both types. Any other distribution of types is also an equilibrium. For instance, a
health plan offering the equilibrium menu may monopolize all low risk individuals and attract a single high
risk individual while another health plan obtains the rest of high risks; and so on.
2 However, this matters for the existence of equilibrium. When firms are allowed to offer menus of contracts,
the parameter set for which an equilibrium exist is smaller than if firms can only offer single contracts.
However, existence is addressed only in passing in the present work.
3 As in Ellis (1998), the model does not preclude interpreting distance as a consumer’s disutility from
seeking a certain style of health care.
4 Other examples of menus include copayments at the point of consumption, which we assume away in
our analysis. However, these copayments could be thought as a decrease in the quality of the service. In
any case, they are quite small when compared to the total cost of care. For instance, in San Francisco (zip
code 94102), “SecureHorizons MedicareDirect” offers “Plan 5” and “Rx Plan 56”. The former has lower
copayments but the latter has a wider coverage of prescription drugs. The same can be said about “Essen-
tial” and “Plan 1” both offered by “AARP MedicareComplete” in San Diego (zip code 92101). The insurer
“Humana” offers both “Choice PPO” and “Gold Plus HMO” in Boston (zip code 60601). “Choice PPO”
has higher copayments than “Gold Plus HMO” but allows to choose providers outside their network. Its
coverage of dental services is more comprehensive than the dental coverage offered by “Gold Plus HMO”
but it does not cover vision services unlike “Gold Plus HMO”. “Gold Plus HMO” has a wider coverage
of prescription drugs. See http://www.medicare.gov/MPPF/Include/DataSection/ Questions/GeneralQues-
tions.asp. Consistently with our analysis, in any of these examples, insures do not need to pay any premium
in addition to their normal Medicare Part B premium.
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risk classes are more narrowly defined because insurance companies can legally offer
different contracts to individuals with different value of their demographics. It is impor-
tant to understand that the results of our model hold within a risk class, no matter how
narrowly or widely defined it is. This means that we are addressing the question of
multiplicity of contracts in the menu offered to each class. It is in this sense that we use
the word “complexity” in the title of our paper. This is different from multiplicity of
contracts across risk classes, usually known as “risk classification” or “categorization”
(Crocker and Snow 2000), under which insurance companies offer different contracts
to individuals with different demographics but the same contract to everyone with the
same demographics.
Our model is addressed to deal with situations where the third party payer pays
the capitation rate in full (or most of it), so that health plans cannot use the part of
the capitation rate charged to the individual (premium) as a tool to screen individuals.
This includes Medicare and Medicaid in the US, the provision of health care of those
under 18 years of age in The Netherlands, the health insurance system in Colombia
after the 1993 reform, and the system providing health care to civil servants in Spain.5
Our results complement what we have learned from the literature dealing with
markets where both adverse selection and horizontal differentiation are present (Jack
2006; Olivella and Vera-Hernández 2007; Biglaiser and Ma 2003; Villas-Boas and
Schmidt-Mohr 1999). This literature has restricted attention to a very particular form
of equilibria: the symmetric separating equilibrium in which the same menu of con-
tracts is used by all health plans to separate risk types.6 This strategy for finding
an equilibrium, which indeed simplifies the analysis, leaves us with the question of
whether other equilibria may exist. Our work provides a partial answer to this strategy,
as it rules out two alternative equilibrium configurations.
The model of horizontal differentiation mostly used in the aforementioned litera-
ture is one where only two health plans exist in the market (one at each extreme of
the Hotelling line). This raises the question of whether the elimination of the fully
specialized equilibrium is just a result of limiting (to 2) the number of health plans
in the market, rather than the effect of horizontal differentiation. Indeed, when the
number of health plans coincides with the number of types, full specialization is not
an equilibrium even in the absence of horizontal differentiation.7 An important con-
tribution of our analysis is to show that three health plans are enough to sustain the
equilibrium with full specialization in the model without differentiation. Therefore,
in order to elicit the effect of horizontal differentiation alone, we use an extension of
the Hotelling model to encompass more than two health plans and we show that full
5 Civil servants in Spain are allowed (paradoxically) to opt out of the compulsory national public health
system and to choose among competing private health plans (Pellisé 1994). This system is referred to as
MUFACE, and we return to it in a footnote in the last section.
6 Ellis and McGuire (2007), Frank et al. (2000), Ma (2004), and Olivella and Schroyen (2009), among
others, also study the market for health plans with horizontal differentiation, but they assume symmetric
information among the parties. They instead focus on an empirical measure of the distortions caused by
cream skimming and dumping (risk selection). Incidentally, these authors also focus on the symmetric
equilibrium.
7 In this respect, Villeneuve (2003) was the first to point out that, in order to extend the results in Rothschild
and Stiglitz to a market with a fixed number of firms, one needs to have at least three firms.
123
308 SERIEs (2010) 1:305–323
specialization is not an equilibrium in this model. We insist that this result holds for
any positive transportation costs, however small. To extend the Hotelling model to
more than two health plans, we use the spokes model first characterized by Chen and
Riordan (2007).8
As mentioned above, our results complement the literature of competition among
health plans. Olivella and Vera-Hernández (2007) characterize the symmetric sepa-
rating equilibrium where each and all health plans offer the same menu of incentive
compatible contracts. They show that, despite the introduction of differentiation among
health plans, an important feature of the equilibrium in the homogenous product model
is retained. Namely, the contract that is aimed at low risks contains a distortion. Those
services that are relatively used more intensely by the high risks will be underprovided
while those services that are used with the same intensity across all population will
be overprovided. In contrast, the equilibrium under differentiation presents two novel
features. First, cross subsidization may exist between the low and the high risks. In
other words, health plans will obtain—in equilibrium—positive profits from each low
risk and will suffer losses from each high risk.9 This is novel because in the unique sep-
arating set of equilibrium contracts under homogeneous product, each affiliate brings
zero profits irrespective of his/her type. This also partly explains why it is possible to
sustain an equilibrium with full specialization in the homogenous product scenario.
More importantly, the competitive equilibrium may fail to be second best. Olivella and
Vera-Hernández (2007) show that this will be the case precisely when the equilibrium
presents cross subsidization. Jack (2006) analyzes the optimal adjustment of capitation
rates in the presence of differentiation. He shows that the results derived by Glazer and
McGuire (2000) in the homogenous product scenario are robust. Namely, if the capi-
tation rate can be adjusted according to some observable (say age), then the capitation
that an old individual brings should more than cover his/her expected expenses, while
the opposite should hold true for the young. Biglaiser and Ma (2003) analyze the mar-
ket for two services that can be either sold in a bundle or separately. Villas-Boas and
Schmidt-Mohr (1999) focus on credit markets and study the case of local monopolies
(less than full market coverage). Encinosa and Sappington (1997) also simultaneously
consider adverse selection and a market imperfection, but the imperfection there is
caused by the existence of fixed entry costs. Moreover, they directly assume that each
plan offers a single contract. They conclude that a pooling equilibrium where low
risks subsidize the high risks exists. In the same spirit, Newhouse (1996) argues that
8 An alternative, and quite standard, model with horizontal differentiation and more than two firms is
Salop’s circular city model (Salop 1979). We have opted for the spokes model because it is a simpler one to
deal with asymmetric equilibria, which we have to confront when we address the issue of full specialization.
Indeed, under full specialization some health plans offer the contract attracting low risks while the rest offer
the contract attracting the high risks. Since in the Salop circle each firm is only directly competing with its
two neighbors (one in each side), such asymmetries would lead us to a large number of cases. Instead, in
the spokes model each firm is directly competing with the rest. Neither the spokes model nor the circular
city model have ever been used to model a competitive screening model with differentiation. These models
are generally used to study the effects of entry under symmetric information.
9 Profits are on average positive at each firm, but this is unsurprising given the introduction of market
power.
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if introducing new contracts is not costless (commercialization costs) then a pooling
equilibrium may exist. We assume away any such costs.
As for the issue of complexity per se, there are at least two strands of the litera-
ture that are somewhat related to our work. The first one argues that complexity itself
could be a strategic variable. In this case, it is important to ascertain whether contract
complexities are strategic complements or substitutes. This ties with the commercial-
ization costs mentioned above. It is a challenge to empirically distinguish between
strategic complementarities and the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the size
of these commercialization costs (Miravete 2009). The other strand addressing con-
tract complexity asks whether this phenomenon could limit competition by raising
switching costs (Frank and Lamiraud 2009). Notice however, that this last strand is
concerned with the complexity of the full set of contracts outstanding in the market,
not at each health plan.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we present the model and analyze the
homogeneous product case as a benchmark. In Sect. 3 we analyze the game under
product differentiation and show our main results. In Sect. 4 we discuss possible rea-
sons why our results may not apply in some settings and conclude the paper. All proofs
are in Appendix.
2 The model
We base our model on a particular case of the spokes model as formalized in Chen and
Riordan (2007).10 This restricted version of the spokes model constitutes the simplest
possible extension to the classic Hotelling model with extreme differentiation, which
is the one that is mostly used in the literature. Our analysis considers N health plans
and two continua of agents (potential enrollees). Each health plan has one hospital.
Each of the N hospitals are located at the ends of each of the N spokes i = 1, 2, . . . , N
emanating from a common origin, as illustrated in Fig. 1. The spokes have length 1/2.
We denote locations in each spoke with their distance to the extreme of the spoke.
Hence health plans are located at point zero in each spoke. Health plan i will be the
health plan with a hospital located at the extreme of spoke i .
Agents are uniformly distributed on the spokes. Their total mass is one. Transpor-
tation costs are t > 0 per unit of distance. Agents can be of two types, high risks or
low risks, in the sense explained below. Each agent knows his type but this is unknown
to the health plans. Plans do know that there is a proportion γ (respectively, 1 − γ )
of low (high) risks. A third party compensates each health plan at a rate r > 0 per
affiliated agent, regardless of the agent’s type.
Health plans compete in the quality of the medical treatment offered. There are two
illnesses, M and N. The probability of suffering illness M is one.11 The probability of
10 Namely, they allow some spokes to be empty while we assume that each an all spokes have a health
plan.
11 This is just for simplicity. What is important is that all individuals face the same probability. Otherwise
we would be facing a multidimensional screening competitive model, the solution of which for the perfectly
competitive case is elusive. See for instance Villeneuve (2003).
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Health plan 4
Health plan 1
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1/2
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Health plan 5
1/2
Health plan 6
Health plan 2
Health plan 3
Fig. 1 The spokes model when N = 6
Firm k
Firm i 1/2
xi
0
Fig. 2 Traveling distances for an individual who resides in spoke i and whose alternative plan is k
suffering illness N is pL for a low risk agent, and pH for a high risk agent. We assume
that 0 < pL < pH < 1.
Irrespective of his type, each agent can enroll into exactly one of two pre-specified
health plans: the one that is on his own spoke and some other plan that is ex-ante
randomly and exogenously chosen.12 This is illustrated in Fig. 2, where the agent
located at point xi in spoke i in the network will be facing a choice between health
plan i and some other plan k chosen by nature. His transportation costs are t xi if he
enrolls health plan i and ( 12 + 12 − xi )t if he enrolls plan k. We refer to plan k simply
as this agent’s “alternative plan”. All health plans are equally likely to be selected as
the alternative, so the probability of each is 1/ (N − 1).
Letting mi and ni be the level of expenditures incurred by health plan i in treating
illness M and N, respectively, the Von-Neumann-Morgenstern gross utility function
12 This is standard in the literature that makes use of the spokes model. An exception is Reggiani (2009).
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of an agent type J affiliated to a health plan i is
U J (mi , ni ) = v(mi ) + pJ v(ni ); J = H, L , and i = 1, . . . , N . (1)
Expenditures mi and ni are only realized if agents are treated. These expenditures
translate into treatment qualities, which are observable by agents. For simplicity, we
have assumed that the function translating expenditures into qualities is the same for
both treatments. All the arguments hereafter generalize to setting vM (z) = vN (z) for
some z. We assume that v is twice-differentiable, increasing and concave.
2.1 Health plans’ contract choices
We assume that both an agent’s location and alternative health plan are non-con-
tractible and hence the expenditure on medical treatment cannot depend on them
(either because it is unobservable by the health plan, or because the law does not
allow it).13 Therefore, health plan i , i = 1, . . . , N ; chooses a menu of two contracts
[(mi L , ni L), (mi H , ni H )]. Of course, it could be that (mi L , ni L) = (mi H , ni H ), in
which case the health plan would de facto be offering a single contract. Hence offer-
ing a single contract can be seen as a particular case of offering a menu. Whether
this can be sustained as an equilibrium or not is one of our main questions. To ease
notation, let wi J = (mi J , ni J ) for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N and J = L , H . We also use
Wi = (wi L , wi H ) and W = (Wi )Ni=1.
2.2 Agent’s decisions and demands
Each health plan offers two (possibly different) contracts. Let U J∗i = Max{U J (wi L),
U J (wi H )} for all i = 1, . . . , N and J = L , H . The details of how one derives the
demands for each health plan can be found in Chen and Riordan (2007). For our
case where each and all spokes have exactly one health plan, the unweighted demand
coming from type-J agents is given by
Di J (W) = 1N − 1
2
N
∑
k =i
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if U J∗i ≤ U J∗k − t
U J∗i −U J∗k +t
2t if U
J∗
k − t ≤ U J∗i ≤ U J∗k + t
1 if U J∗i > U
J∗
k + t .
(2)
To gain some intuition on this formula, we provide a few (extreme) examples. Fix
some type J and look at health plan i ′s demand as a proportion within this type’s popu-
lation. Suppose first that all plans offer the same final utility to type J , i.e., U J∗i = U J∗k
13 This is also standard in the literature, again with the exception of Reggiani (2009). In any case, if loca-
tions and alternative plans were verifiable and contracts could discriminate accordingly, we would return
to the standard (homogeneous product) adverse selection model for each location and alternative plan
configuration. This would not add new insights to the homogenous product model.
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for all k. We have Di J (W) = 1N−1 2N (N − 1) 12 = 1N , as expected. Suppose now that
the best contract for type J out of those offered by i is so much inferior to the rivals’
that U J∗i ≤ U J∗k − t for all k. Then even individuals residing at the extreme of health
plan i’s spoke would prefer to travel to the randomly assigned alternative, no matter
where it is, and therefore Di J (W) = 0. Finally, suppose that U J∗i ≥ U J∗k + t for all k.
Then all individuals, no matter where they reside, would prefer to travel to the health
plan in spoke i if that was indeed a possibility. A proportion N−1N of the population of
the given type resides outside i’s spoke, and out of these, a proportion 1/(N − 1) are
lucky enough to be given the possibility to enroll plan i . This yields a compounded
proportion of N−1N
1
N−1 = 1N outsiders. A proportion 1/N of this type’s population
resides in spoke i , and they can and will enroll with health plan i . This yields a pro-
portion of insiders equal to 1/N . The sum of outsiders plus insiders yields 2/N , as
given by the formula: 1N−1
2
N
∑
k =i 1 = 1N−1 2N (N − 1) = 2N .
Respectively, γ Di L (W) and (1 − γ ) Di H (W) are the demands of type L and H
that health plan i faces. To ease notation, we omit (W) from the notation in demand.
It is clear that each health plan demands depend on all the outstanding contracts in
the economy. Since agents receive treatment for free, we do not need to impose any
liquidity or participation constraints.14
Most importantly, notice that this model reduces to the usual Hotelling model with
maximum differentiation when N = 2.
2.3 Health plans’ payoffs
The per capita profit obtained by any health plan that has attracted an agent of type J
with contract w = (m, n) is given by
J (w) = r − m − pJ n, J = L , H. (3)
If health plan i offers contracts wi L = (mi L , ni L) and wi H = (mi H , ni H ), then its
average payoff is given by:
γ Di LL(wi L) + (1 − γ )Di HH (wi H ),
where Di L and Di H are given in 2. Therefore, we are assuming that health plans are
risk neutral.
2.4 Efficiency and pre-efficiency
Notice that productive efficiency would require that the marginal benefit of one dollar
invested in any given treatment should be equated to its marginal cost, which is of
course 1. Hence a contract w = (m, n) is efficient if v′(m) = v′(n) = 1. Notice that
a necessary but not sufficient condition for efficiency is that v′(m) = v′(n), implying
14 If transportations costs were very large, patients might decide not to take any treatment. It is enough to
assume that v(0) = −∞ to avoid this possibility.
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m = n, a condition that we refer to as pre-efficiency. If a contract is pre-efficient, any
departure from it will either lead to lower profits or make the individual worse-off
(all in expected terms). It turns out that whether pre-efficiency is satisfied or not is
important for some arguments below.15
Definition 1 If a contract w = (m, n) satisfies m = n, i.e., if quality across treatments
is equalized, we then say that contract w is pre-efficient.
2.5 The timing of the game
The first mover is Nature, who chooses both each agent’s type according to Pr (L) = γ
and each agent’s alternative plan k according to Pr (k | reside in spoke i) = 1/(N −1)
for all i and k = i . The second movers are the health plans, who simultaneously offer
a contract or a menu of contracts without any capacity constraints. Once a contract is
offered, it cannot be withdrawn. Nor can it be denied to an agent demanding it. That
is, for all i = 1, . . . , N ; health plan i commits to serve any agent willing to accept a
contract w at health plan i . The last movers are the agents, who decide which contract
to accept out of those outstanding in the market.
2.6 Equilibrium
We define equilibrium next, applying the notion of subgame perfection on the tim-
ing described above.16 The equilibrium of the subgame played by agents yields the
demand functions given in 2. Given these demands, health plans simultaneously choose
contracts. We restrict attention to pure-strategy equilibria.
Definition 2 A vector of menus of contracts {[wi L , wi H ]}Ni=1 ∈ (	2× 	2)N with
associated demands defined in 2 is said to be an equilibrium if neither health plan
gains additional profits by offering an alternative menu of contracts
[
w′L , w′H
]
, given
the menu of contracts offered by the other health plans.
2.7 The equilibrium in the homogeneous product case
As a benchmark, we first characterize the (unique) equilibrium set of contracts
{w0L , w0H } when there is no differentiation (t = 0). In order to derive a parallel-
ism with Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model of the market for insurance with free
15 If the valuation function was different across treatments then a contract (m, n) would be efficient if
v′M (m) = v′N (n) = 1 and it would be pre-efficient if n = φ(m) for some increasing function φ. Since we
have assumed that vM (z) = vN (z) for all z, φ is the identity here.
16 Incidentally, in the homogeneous product case, several authors (Miyazaki 1977 and Spence 1978 among
others) have used Wilson (1977) equilibrium notion to derive their results. According to this equilibrium
notion, when one calculates the payoff of a deviation, the deviating firm assumes that other firms will
withdraw those insurance contracts that generate losses due to the deviation. Riley (2001) and Crocker
and Snow (1985) criticize these non-Nash behavioral assumptions. We instead stick to the standard Nash
equilibrium concept.
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entry, we assume that there are at least three health plans in the market, N ≥ 3.17 The
equilibrium set of contracts, if it exists, solves the following system of four equations
with four unknowns (m0H , n0H , m0L , n0L ):
(i) Zero profits from the high risks, that is H (w0H ) = r − m0H − pH n0H = 0,
(ii) Efficiency for the high risk contract, or m0H = n0H ,
(iii) Zero profits from the low risks, or L(w0L) = r − m0L − pLn0L = 0, and
(iv) High risks’ binding incentive compatibility constraint, or
U H (w0H ) = v(m0H ) + pHv(n0H ) = v(m0L) + pHv(n0L) = U H (w0L).
The equilibrium is obtained graphically in Fig. 3. The per capita isoprofit lines
are straight and their slope is −1/pJ , J = H, L . The indifference curves have slope
−v′(m)/pJ v′(n), J = H, L . Pre-efficient contracts lie in the 45◦ line, where m = n
and the slopes are equated. Equations (i) and (ii) yield w0H . Then use (iii) and (iv) to
obtain w0L . Notice that the horizontal intercept of the zero-isoprofits for both types is
r , since r − m J − pH n J = 0 and n J = 0 imply m J = r , for all J = H, L . The
indifference curve (v) will be used later on.
Existence is guaranteed if the set of contracts {w0L , w0H } is second best, that is, if it
is impossible to implement a Pareto-improvement unless the types of individuals are
observable to the planner.18 This is in turn guaranteed if the proportion γ of low risks
is not too high.19 We assume that this is the case for the rest of the analysis.
It is important to point out that, despite a single equilibrium set of contracts exists,
there are many equilibrium configurations. As explained in the introduction, one is
where health plans fully specialize. That is, each of the N health plans offers exactly
one of the contracts in the set {w0L , w0H }. Formally,
Proposition 1 Suppose that N > 2 and that {w0L , w0H } is second best. Then the fol-
lowing allocation of contracts and agents to health plans constitutes an equilibrium.
Health plans belong to exactly one of the following two sets: the set L of health plans
that offer the single contract w0L and only attract low risks, or the set H of health plans
17 As pointed out by Villeneuve (2003), if there are only two health plans then the equilibrium with full
specialization breaks down. The argument is simple and makes use of Fig. 3. If (WLOG) health plan 1
offers w0H and health plan 2 offers w
0
L , then health plan 2 can deviate to a contract w
′
L slightly to the South
West of w0L (not depicted). Despite the fact that such a contract is worse than w0L in all dimensions, it still
attracts all low risks. This is for two reasons. First, no health plan offering w0L remains. Second, the low
risk incentive compatibility constraint is not binding in the putative equilibrium, so U L (w0H ) < U
L
(
w0L
)
.
Since U L
(
w′L
)
can be as close to U L
(
w0L
)
as desired, we have U L (w0H ) < U
L (w′L
)
. Notice that w′L
brings additional profits per low risk. Finally and most importantly, w′L does not attract any high risks
since it lies below the high risk indifference curve going though w0H . Hence the deviation brings additional
profits. Part of this argument points at the sufficiency of having three health plans to sustain the equilibrium
with full specialization: if N ≥ 3 then one health plan offers w0H and the other two offer w0L . An unilateral
deviation to w′L attracts no one.
18 Technically, second best optimality is sufficient to guarantee existence of a competitive equilibrium. It
would not be necessary if firms were constrained to offer single contracts. Indeed, as shown by Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976), competitive equilibria exist that are not second best if γ takes some intermediate interval
of values. If one instead allows firms to offer menus (as we do), it is still an open question whether second
best optimality is necessary for existence or not.
19 This was proven by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
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n (iii)
(iv)
(ii)
0
Lw
0
Hw
(v)
(i)
mr
Fig. 3 The set of equilibrium contracts under homogeneous product
that only offer the single contract w0H and only attract high risks; moreover, there are
at least 2 health plans in set L and there is at least one health plan in set H.
It is important to underline that the equilibrium with full specialization is obtained
despite the fact that we are allowing health plans to offer menus of contracts. In the
next section we prove our most important result, namely, that under horizontal differ-
entiation, however small, we can rule out this equilibrium. Also in the next section we
rule out any configuration where all health plans attract both types of agents with a
single contract, so that a minimum contract complexity prevails in equilibrium.
3 The game under differentiation
We start with our main contribution, i.e., ruling out equilibria with full specialization.
Proposition 2 Assume that t > 0, however small. Then there does not exist an equi-
librium where health plans are fully specialized, that is, where some health plans only
attract high risks with a single contract and the rest of health plans only attract low
risks with another single contract while all risks are served.20
20 Notice that the configuration that we are ruling out would have to involve two different contracts.
Suppose, by contradiction, that all health plans offer the same single contract. Then, since both types are
distributed uniformly on the spokes, such contract would attract an equal share of high and low risks,
contradicting full specialization.
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Let us make use of a particular example to provide some intuition. Take N = 5.
Suppose that wi is offered by health plans 1, 2 and 3 and that they so attract all low
risks and suppose that wk is offered by health plans 4 and 5 and that they so attract
all high risks. This means that high risks close to 1, 2, or 3 and who have health plan
4 or 5 as an alternative prefer wk to wi , despite transportation costs. Symmetrically,
low risks close to 4 or 5 and who have health plan 1, 2 or 3 as an alternative prefer wi
to wk despite transportation costs. Hence, the pair of contracts {wi , wk} satisfies all
types’ incentive compatibility constraints with some slack. Suppose that either health
plan 4 (or 5) unilaterally deviates by offering the menu {wi , wk}. Then this health plan
still captures his share of high risks and steals all low risks on its spoke from health
plans 1, 2, and 3. Moreover, health plan k is able to do this without violating incentive
compatibility. Its profits increase if L(wi ) is positive, which we can guarantee thanks
to the existing market power that differentiation brings. The formal proof extends this
intuition to having any number of health plans and to any configuration of contracts.
As explained in the introduction, another important contribution of our analysis is to
provide support for the strategy of focusing on the symmetric separating equilibrium
once differentiation is present. The next proposition provides this support as it rules
out an important class of potential equilibrium configurations, basically, those where
single contracts are used rather than menus.
Proposition 3 Suppose that in equilibrium all health plans attract agents of both types
(that is, Di J > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N and J = L , H). Then at least one health plan
must be offering a menu of contracts.21
Thus, we can ensure that interior equilibria must entail some minimum contract
complexity, in the sense explained in the introduction. The intuition behind this
proposition follows two steps. The first step is to understand that if a health plan
attracts a positive quantity of both types in equilibrium with a single contract, this
contract must be pre-efficient (m = n). Suppose it is not. This same health plan can
increase its profits by deviating to a separating menu of contracts. This separating menu
offers the low risk the same non-pre-efficient contract while it offers the high risk the
contract that is pre-efficient and gives him the same utility as the original contract. It
turns out that such a menu of contracts is incentive compatible. The deviating health
plan makes additional per capita profits on the high risk while his demand of both
types remains unaltered. In other words, pre-efficiency is a necessary condition for a
contract to be robust to menu deviations by the same health plan (internal stability).
The second step is to understand that pre-efficiency in one health plan does not imply
that all rival’s best response are also a pre-efficient contract. Notice that pre-efficiency
puts constraints on the contract. Once a health plan offers a single pre-efficient con-
tract, another health plan’s best response is not another pre-efficient contract (external
21 Notice we are also ruling out that all health plans offer the same single contract. If this was the case then,
since both types are distributed uniformly on the spokes, such a contract would be attracting both types.
This would imply that the assumptions in Proposition 3 apply (all health plans attract both types of agents
with a single contract each). But Proposition 3 says that at least one health plan would have to be offering
a menu, contradiction. Notice also that Proposition 3 is not a generalization of Proposition 2 because the
premise in Proposition 3 is that each and all health plans attract agents of both types, which fails to hold
under full specialization.
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stability fails). The reason is that the rival health plan will try to screen agents in order
to avoid the high risks. Therefore, a vector of N pre-efficient contracts (one per health
plan) attracting a positive quantity of both types is not an equilibrium. But if one of the
contracts is not pre-efficient then the health plan offering it can do better by deviating
to a menu (by step 1). This explains Proposition 3.
4 Concluding remarks
We have shown that, even if firms are allowed to offer menus of contracts in a model of
the market for health plans, an equilibrium with full specialization cannot be ruled out
in the perfectly competitive setting with more than two health plans. Full specialization
entails each health plan offering a single contract in each risk class, although the mar-
ket induces separation because different health plans offer different contracts. More
importantly, we have also shown that this equilibrium is non-generic, since any hori-
zontal differentiation would rule it out. In other words, at least one health plan should
be attracting more than one type of agent. Another contribution of our analysis is to
rule out another large class of equilibria, namely, those where health plans offer a sin-
gle contract each and yet attract both types of agents. This constitutes a lower bound
on the complexity of contracts at each health plan and for each risk class.
One may wonder why there are instances of markets in reality where no health plan
offers a menu. Generally speaking, there are several possible answers to this, some
coming from our analysis, some lying beyond its scope. First, if plans are homoge-
neous (that is, if “transportation costs” are nil) then we have shown that it is possible
to sustain an equilibrium where no health plan offers a menu and where plans spe-
cialize in attracting just one type of agent. However, as mentioned above, this a very
non-generic result. Another possibility would be that agents do not have any private
information, that is, that the plans’ classification system is as fine a partition of as the
one that agent’s information conveys.22 Outside the scope of our analysis is the possi-
bility that maintaining a menu of contracts might be costly, as it would entail checking,
at every point of use, which of the contracts in the menu has the enrollee signed for.23
Finally, it could also be the case that laws exist that forbid menus altogether, as the
MUFACE system serving health care to civil servants in Spain.24
Turning back to our setting, our results provide partial support to focusing on the
symmetric separating equilibrium where each health plan offers the same menu of
incentive compatible contracts, which is the method used in the literature. The dis-
cussion above suggests that, even in the light of our results, such a method could be
misleading in the presence of regulations that limit the flexibility, assumed in many
analyses, that plans have in designing their contracts.
22 This is a highly controversial issue. See for instance, Finkelstein and McGarry 2006 and references
thereof.
23 Newhouse (1996); Miravete (2009).
24 We are grateful to a referee for pointing this out to us. The MUFACE case is quite extreme, because reg-
ulation not only bans menus but also mandates that, in each service, the quality served by the private health
plans must be equivalent to that of the public health system (INSS). Inspections are performed regularly to
ensure this.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 It is obvious that no health plan gains by offering the menu
{w0L , w0H }, since both L(w0L) and H (w0H ) are zero. Now suppose that some health
plan deviates to an alternative menu {w′L , w′H }.
Suppose first that the menu only attracts low risks and does so through w′L . For w′L
to attract low risks it must be true that w′L is on or above curve (v) in Fig. 1, or
U L
(
w′L
) ≥ U L
(
w0L
)
. (A1)
The reason is that there are at least two health plans offering contract w0L . For this devi-
ation to make additional—and hence positive—profits, contract w′L must be strictly
below isoprofit line L(w) = 0 (given by (iii)). Hence w′L is in the lens formed by (v)
and (iii) and not coincide with w0L . Notice that this implies that the high risks strictly
prefer w′L to w0H , or
U H
(
w′L
)
> U H
(
w0H
)
. (A2)
This contradicts that the menu {w′L , w′H } only attracts low risks.
Suppose now that the menu {w′L , w′H } only attracts high risks, and that it does so
through w′H . The high risks have always the option to accept w0L , which by binding
incentive compatibility of the original set of contracts, is as good as w0H , i.e.,
U H
(
w0L
)
= U H
(
w0H
)
. (A3)
Hence, even if the deviating health plan was the only one that was originally offering
w0H , to attract high risks it must be true that w
′
H is above curve (iv) in Fig. 1, or
U H
(
w′H
) ≥ U H
(
w0H
)
. (A4)
By tangency, at w0H , of the isoprofit line H (w) = 0 [given by (i)] and the indifference
curve U H (w) = U H (w0H ) [given by (iv)], w′H must yield losses, so such deviation is
not profitable.
Finally, suppose that the menu {w′L , w′H } is incentive compatible and attracts both
types. Then both A1 and A4 must hold. For such a deviation to be profitable it must
be true that
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γL
(
w′L
) + (1 − γ )H (w′H
)
> 0. (A5)
Notice that A1, A4, and A5 jointly imply that the set of contracts {w0L , w0H } is not
second best: health plans strictly prefer {w′L , w′H } to {w0L , w0H } while individuals are
at least as well-off; a contradiction. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2 In several steps.
Step 1 Definitions. For each J ∈ {L , H}, suppose a non-empty set of health plans
IJ only attracts J − t ype individuals, and that each health plan i ∈ IJ is doing so
by means of contract
(
m Ji , n
J
i
)
. Suppose also that IL ∪ IH = I and IL ∩ IH = ∅.
Let w−i =
[(
m J1 , n
J
1
)
, . . . .,
(
m Ji−1, n
J
i−1
)
,
(
m Jn+1, n Ji+1
)
, . . . .,
(
m JN , n
J
N
)]
, where J
is to be substituted by the appropriate type depending on whether i ∈ IL or i ∈ IH .
Step 2 Strict incentive compatibility. The fact that no health plan i in IL attracts any high
risk implies that even the high risk that is closest to health plan i prefers to travel the
full length of i’s spoke plus the full length of the spoke of alternative health plan k ∈ IH
than enrolling health plan i . Formally, v
(
m Hk
)+ pHv
(
nHk
)− t ≥ v (mLi
)+ pHv
(
nLi
)
for all k ∈ IH and i ∈ IL . Similarly, the fact that no health plan k in IH attracts any
low risk implies that v
(
mLi
) + pLv
(
nLi
) − t ≥ v (m Hk
) + pHv
(
nHk
)
for all k ∈ IH
and i ∈ IL .
Step 3 Show that all health plans in IL make positive profits. Suppose first that one
health plan makes negative profits. Then let this health plan deviate to m = n = 0.
Hence r − m − pLn = r > 0. The worst that can happen is that this health plan
attracts no-one. In that case the health plan still makes zero profits, a contradiction.
Let us suppose mow, by contradiction, that some health plan i in IL makes exactly zero
profits, or r − mLi − pJ n Ji = 0. Let this health plan deviate from
(
mLi , n
L
i
)
to w′ =(
m′, n′
) = (m Ji − ε, n Ji − ε
)
. If health plan i was not attracting any high risks with the
original contract, less it will do so with a worse contract. Hence Di H
(
w′, w−i
) = 0.
As for the low risks’ demand, this will be given by
Di L(w′, w−i ) =
1
N − 1
2
N
∑
k =i
k∈IL
t + v(mLi − ε) + pLv(nLi − ε) − v(mLk ) − pLv(nLk )
2t
def= D˜L (ε) .
Now, since i was attracting some L individuals in the original contract profile, it must
have been true that D˜L (0) > 0. Hence, by continuity of the function D˜L , there must
exist ε > 0 such that D˜L (ε) > 0. Hence health plan i’s total profits are increased by
γ D˜L (ε) (r − mLi + ε − pLnLi + pLε) = γ D˜L (ε) ε(1 + pL) > 0, and we have found
a profitable deviation.
Step 4 Construct a profitable deviation from the putative equilibrium. Pick any health
plan in IL , say i∗ and any health plan k∗ in IH . Now assume that health plan k∗, instead
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of offering contract
(
m Hk∗ , n
H
k∗
)
, offers the menu
{(
m Hk∗ , n
H
k∗
)
,
(
mLi∗ , n
L
i∗
)}
. By Step 2,
v
(
m Hk∗
) + pHv
(
nHk∗
) − t ≥ v (mLi
) + pHv
(
nLi
)
for all i ∈ IL (including i∗), so the
first contract in the menu will only attract high risks, and health plan k∗’s share of
high risks will remain the same, as well as the profits per high risk individual. Also by
Step 2, v
(
mLi∗
) + pLv
(
nLi∗
) − t ≥ v (m Hk
) + pHv
(
nHk
)
for all k ∈ IH , so the second
contract in the menu will only attract low risks. The question is whether it will attract
any low risks. If it does we are done since these affiliates are new for health plan k, and
in Step 3 we showed that such consumers bring in positive profits per capita. Consider
low risks who reside in health plan k∗’s spoke. Nature assigns to some of them health
plan i∗ as the only alternative health plan. Such individuals have to choose between
health plan k∗’s contract aimed to low risks and the same contract offered by health
plan i∗. They will of course choose to stay with the closer health plan k∗, and we are
done. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1 If a health plan i offers a single contract (mi , ni ) (or two contracts of which
one is never chosen) and if 0 < Di L = Di H < 1, then this health plan’s contract must
be pre-efficient. That is, mi = ni .
Assume first, by contradiction, that a health plan offers the contract w′ = (m′, n′)
with m′ > n′. We now find an alternative strategy that increases the profits of this
health plan, whatever the other health plan does. Consider the menu of contracts
[w′, w′′], with m′ > m′′ = n′′ > n′, and U H (w′′) = U H (w′). Hence H has no inter-
est in camouflaging when asked to choose w′′. We prove next that L has no interest in
camouflaging when asked to choose w′. Notice first that U H (w′′) = U H (w′) implies
that v(n′) = v(m′′)−v(m′)pH + v(n′′). Hence U L(w′) − U L(w′′) = v(m′) + pLv(n′) −
v(m′′) − pLv(n′′) = v(m′) + pL
[
v(m′′)−v(m′)
pH + v(n′′)
]
− v(m′′) − pLv(n′′) = (1 −
pL
pH )
[
v(m′) − v(m′′)] > 0. Notice that both types are indifferent between the previ-
ous single contract and the new menu of contracts. Therefore, demands are unaltered
whatever the type. Since Di H > 0, it suffices to show that profits derived from one
H -agent are larger. (The profits derived from the other type are unaltered.) This is
straightforward: contracts w′ and w′′ yield the same expected utility to agents while
w′′ is pre-efficient while w′ is not.
A similar argument can be used to show that a pooling contract w′ = (m′, n′) with
m′ < n′, cannot be part of a pooling equilibrium. (Use a menu of contracts where
L receives a pre-efficient contract without changing his utility and which leaves the
original pooling unaltered. The high risk will stay put and the low risk will move to
the new contract. Profits derived from the low risk increase.)
Step 2 If in equilibrium 0 < Di L < 1 and 0 < Di H < 1 for all i , then it cannot be the
case that all health plans offer a single contract each.
Suppose that 0 < Di L < 1 and 0 < Di H < 1 but that, by contradiction, all
health plans offer a single contract each, say w¯i = (m¯i , n¯i ). By step 1, this implies
that m¯i = n¯i for all i . Since this constitutes an equilibrium then it must be the case
that W¯i = (w¯Hi , w¯Li ) = [(m¯i , m¯i ), (m¯i , m¯i )] is health plan i’s best response to each
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of the rest of the health plans’ (degenerate menu) choice, 25 denoted by W¯−i ={
W¯k
}
k =i =
{
(w¯Hk , w¯
L
k )
}
k =i = {[(m¯k, m¯k), (m¯k, m¯k)]}k =i . In general, the menu of
contracts Wi =
[(
mLi , n
L
i
)
,
(
m Hi , n
H
i
)]
that is the best response to W¯−i solves
Max
Wi
γL(m
L
i , n
L
i )Di L
(
Wi , W¯−i
)
+(1 − γ )H (m Hi , nHi )Di H (Wi , W¯−i ),
subject to
v(mLi ) + pLv(nLi ) ≥ v(m Hi ) + pLv(nHi )
v(m Hi ) + pHv(nHi ) ≥ v(mLi ) + pHv(nLi ),
where
L(m
L
i , n
L
i ) = r − mLi − pLnLi ,
H (m
H
i , n
H
i ) = r − m Hi − pH nHi ,
and, by virtue of the assumption that demands are interior,
Di L
(
Wi , W¯−i
) = 1
N − 1
2
N
∑
k =i
v(mLi ) − v(m¯k) + pL
(
v(nLi ) − v(m¯k)
) + t
2t
Di H
(
Wi , W¯−i
) = 1
N − 1
2
N
∑
k =i
v(m Hi ) − v(m¯k) + pH
(
v(nHi ) − v(m¯k)
) + t
2t
The Lagrangian is
£i = γL(wi L) 1N − 1
2
N
∑
k =i
v(mLi ) − v(m¯k) + pL
(
v(nLi ) − v(m¯k)
) + t
2t
+(1 − γ )H (wi H ) 1N − 1
2
N
∑
k =i
v(m Hi ) − v(m¯k) + pH
(
v(nHi ) − v(m¯k)
) + t
2t
μH
(
U H (wi H ) − U H (wi L)
)
+ μL
(
U L(wi L) − U L(wi H )
)
.
The Khun and Tucker conditions include (after noting that 1N−1 2N
∑
k =i
v′(m Ji )
2t =
v′(m Ji )
Nt and that
1
N−1
2
N
∑
k =i
v′(n Ji )
2t =
v′(n Ji )
Nt )
25 The rival’s menu is degenerate for two reasons: they are just offering a single contract (or the two
components of the menu are the same) and moreover expenditures in the two illnesses is the same.
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γ
[
L(wi L)
v′(m Ji )
Nt
− Di L
]
− (μH − μL) v′(mi L) = 0,
γ pL
[
L(wi L)
v′(m Ji )
Nt
− Di L
]
− (μH pH − μL pL) v′(ni L) = 0,
(1 − γ )
[
H (wi H )
v′(n Ji )
Nt
− Di H
]
+ (μH − μL) v′(mi H ) = 0,
(1 − γ )pH
[
H (wi H )
v′(n Ji )
Nt
− Di H
]
+ (μH pH − μL pL) v′(ni H ) = 0.
The above conditions must be satisfied at (wHi , wLi ) = [(m¯i , m¯i ), (m¯i , m¯i )].
Substituting these values into the previous conditions and letting L = γ [L(m¯i , m¯i )
v′(m¯i )
Nt − Di L
]
and H = (1 − γ )
[
H (m¯i , m¯i )
v′(m¯i )
Nt − Di H
]
we can write
L = (μH − μL) v′(m¯i ), (A6)
pL L = (μH pH − μL pL) v′(m¯i ), (A7)
H = − (μH − μL) v′(m¯i ), (A8)
pH H = − (μH pH − μL pL) v′(m¯i ). (A9)
or, adding A6 with A8 and A7 with A9,
L + H = 0,
pL L + pH H = 0.
Since pL = pH , this implies that L = H = 0, or
L(m¯i , m¯i )
v′(m¯i )
Nt
= Di L ,
H (m¯i , m¯i )
v′(m¯i )
Nt
= Di H .
Now, the above conditions must also hold at any health plan that is best responding
to the rest. Hence we can add across i = 1, . . . , n to get
∑
i=1,...,n
L(m¯i , m¯i )
v′(m¯i )
Nt
=
∑
i=1,...,n
Di L = 1,
∑
i=1,...,n
H (m¯i , m¯i )
v′(m¯i )
Nt
=
∑
i=1,...,n
Di H = 1.
Subtract these expressions to get
∑
i=1,...,n
[L(m¯i , m¯i ) − H (m¯i , m¯i )] v
′(m¯i )
Nt
= 0.
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However, L(m¯i , m¯i ) = r − m¯i (1 + pL) > r − m¯i (1 + pH ) = H (m¯i , m¯i ) for
all i , contradiction. This concludes the proof. unionsq
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